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SMITH v. CITY OF JACKSON: THE
AGE DISCRIMINATION ACT
AUTHORIZES DISPARATE IMPACT
CLAIMS, BUT ONLY IN NARROW
CIRCUMSTANCES
BRIAN HOLLADAY*

1
Before the Supreme Court decided Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins in
1993, claims for the disparate impact theory of discrimination under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) were available
in every circuit.2 Ironically, in Hazen Paper the plaintiff did not pursue
a claim under disparate impact, and instead proceeded solely on a
3
theory of disparate treatment. Justice O’Connor, writing for the
unanimous Court, emphasized that disparate treatment requires a
finding of employer motivation to discriminate, but disparate impact
does not.4 The Court found that “[d]isparate treatment, thus defined,
captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the
5
ADEA.” The opinion also noted, “we have never decided whether a
disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA . . .
and we need not do so here.”6
In the aftermath of Hazen Paper, circuit courts were unsure of
how to interpret the Court’s cryptic comments about disparate impact

* 2006 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law
1. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
2. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1542–43 (2005).
3. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
4. Id. at 609; see also Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335–36 n.15 (1977)
(explaining that in disparate treatment claims, “the employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical . . . . [Disparate impact claims] involve employment practices
that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory
motive . . . is not required under a disparate-impact theory”) (citations omitted).
5. Id. at 610.
6. Id.
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in the ADEA. The Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits continued to
allow disparate impact claims. In contrast, the First, Fifth, Seventh,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits interpreted the comments to disfavor
7
disparate impact and refused to allow them.
It was into this confusing legal landscape that Smith v. City of
Jackson entered in 1999. In May of that year, the city of Jackson,
Mississippi, revised the salary structure for its police and public safety
8
officers. The city’s new structure granted salary increases to all police
officers and public safety dispatchers.9 In an effort to make starting
salaries regionally competitive, the increases were proportionally
10
higher for officers with less than five years of seniority. Most of the
officers with greater than five years of seniority were over the age of
11
forty. After the pay raise was instituted, thirty police officers and
public safety dispatchers over the age of forty filed an age
discrimination suit against the city.12 The plaintiffs pursued claims
under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
13
liability.
With only the Supreme Court’s dicta in Hazen Paper as a guide,
the district court was greeted with a case of first impression on the
14
question of the availability of a disparate impact claim. The district
court ruled that disparate impact was not available under the
15
ADEA. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment,16 and the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s
ruling to the Fifth Circuit. A three judge panel affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment against the plaintiffs on the

7. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1543 n.9 (finding that “in contrast to the First, Seventh, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits, which have held that there is no disparate-impact theory, the Second,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits continue to recognize such a theory”) (citations omitted). See also
Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding in the decision below that
the Fifth Circuit does not recognize a disparate-impact theory of liability).
8. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539.
9. Smith, 351 F.3d at 184.
10. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539.
11. Id.
12. Smith, 351 F.3d at 184–85.
13. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1539.
14. See Smith, 351 F.3d at 184.
15. Id. (finding also that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence on the disparate
treatment claim to survive summary judgment).
16. Id.

DO NOT DELETE

2006]

12/30/2008 12:08:37 PM

SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON

19
17

grounds that the ADEA does not authorize disparate impact claims,
though one judge dissented.18
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The rift among circuits foreshadowed the contentious Supreme Court
decision, which rested on an unlikely coalition forged between Justice
Scalia and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice
Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred
in judgment. The plurality held that the ADEA does authorize claims
19
under a theory of disparate impact. The Court overruled the lower
court on both the legal principle and application of the principle to
this case.20 In opposition, Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring
opinion that Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. Although her
opinion found little common ground with Justice Stevens’s plurality
opinion, the concurring opinion ultimately dictated the same
disposition of the case, and this may be viewed as a concurrence.
The disagreement between the plurality and concurrence began
with their differing interpretations of the statutory history of the
ADEA. In examining the ADEA’s statutory history, both the plurality
and the concurrence analyzed a report written by Secretary of Labor
Willard Wirtz in 1965. The Secretary’s findings, commonly known as
the “Wirtz Report,” were the result of a request by Congress for a
“study of the factors which might tend to result in discrimination in
21
employment because of age.” Congress also asked the Secretary to
propose statutory language to remedy the problems addressed in the
22
report. Because Congress adopted the proposed language in the
ADEA, both the plurality23 and concurrence24 viewed the Wirtz
Report as a reliable source of Congressional intent.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 199.
19. Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536, 1540 (2005).
20. See id. at 1546 (stating that because the Supreme Court overruled the Fifth Circuit on
both the legal principle and the application of that principle to this case, the Supreme Court
agreed with the Fifth Circuit that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be
granted. Ironically, the Supreme Court therefore “affirmed” the Fifth Circuit).
21. Id. at 1540.
22. Id. at 1552 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
23. See id. at 1540 (majority opinion) (stating that Congress enacted ADEA legislation in
response to the Wirtz Report).
24. Id. at 1552 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

DO NOT DELETE

20

12/30/2008 12:08:37 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR

VOL. 1:17

The Wirtz Report identified three common instances in which
older workers were treated differently than younger workers. The first
was disparate treatment of older workers based on unfounded
25
assumptions about the effects of age. The second and third instances
were examples of age-based classifications that had a disparate impact
on older workers. Neither instance involved an actual employer’s
intent to discriminate. The second instance was differentiation based
on the actual effects of age.26 Finally, the third instance entailed
classifications, such as seniority, that should have benefited older
workers but may have practically worked against them by making
them more costly to employ.27 The Secretary advised the first category
be remedied by legislation.28 In contrast, the Secretary recommended
the second and third categories be corrected through “noncoercive
measures” such as programs and education.29 The concurrence saw
these noncoercive measures as the exclusive remedy of the ADEA
under claims of disparate impact. Based on the Wirtz Report, Justice
O’Connor concluded that “intentional discrimination was clearly
distinguished from circumstances and practices merely having a
disparate impact on older workers, which—as ADEA sections 2, 3,
and 5 make clear—Congress intended to address through research,
education, and possible future legislative action.”30
The concurrence’s interpretation was “not persuasive” to the
plurality.31 Instead, the plurality stated that Congress meant the
coercive measures to be merely a partial solution. After examining
the Wirtz Report, Justice Stevens found, “there is nothing to suggest
that [Congress] intended such measures to be the sole method of
achieving the desired result of remedying practices that had an
adverse effect on older workers.”32
The Wirtz Report was not the only matter of statutory history that
divided the Justices; the plurality and concurrence also reached
different conclusions about the degree of similarity between the
ADEA and Title VII. The comparison is important because the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 1553.
Id.
Id. at 1553–54.
Id. at 1554.
Id. at 1554.
Id. at 1554–55.
Id. at 1543 n.7.
Id.
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33
Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power interpreted Title VII to
authorize disparate impact claims, and part of the language
interpreted was identical to the language contained in the ADEA.34 In
addition to the same language, the two statutes have similar purposes
35
and were enacted one shortly after the other. Invoking a rule of
statutory construction, the plurality explained that when statutes are
similar in language, purpose, and time, “it is appropriate to presume
that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both
statutes.”36 Thus, the plurality held that the Griggs finding of disparate
37
impact also applies to the ADEA. In contrast, the concurrence found
“significant textual differences between Title VII and the ADEA that
indicate differences in congressional intent.”38
Still, the Justices’ arguments were not limited to statutory history.
The plurality and concurrence also clashed on points of statutory
interpretation. One such clash concerned Section 623(a)(2), which
was read in relation to Section 623(a)(1). Section 623(a)(1) made it
illegal for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual’s age.”39 Section 623(a)(2)
dictated that no employer could “limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual’s age.”40
Both the plurality and concurrence agreed that Section 623(a)(1)
did not authorize disparate impact claims. Instead, their disagreement
focused on Section 623(a)(2)—the provision that the plurality
believed to authorize disparate impact liability because of its textual
differences from Section 623(a)(1). The plurality focused on the
language, “otherwise adversely affect” in Section 623(a)(2) to

33. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
34. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1541.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1542.
38. Id. at 1557 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The two textual differences the concurrence
points to are the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000) and the defense for actions based on
“reasonable factors other than age.” Id. at 1551.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000).
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highlight that the provision prohibited effects of the employer’s
41
action, even in the absence of an intent to discriminate.
In addition, the plurality believed that Section 623(a)(2) contained
an incongruity between the employer’s action and the individual
42
employee. This incongruity stemmed from Congress’s use of the
plural “his employees” in the first part of the provision and then the
singular “any individual” and “his status” in the latter part of the
provision.43 According to the plurality, the incongruity showed that an
employer could be held liable for an employment action that had a
discriminatory effect on an employee because of his age, even if the
employer had no intent to discriminate, and that this was “the very
definition of disparate impact.”44
The concurrence saw no incongruity in Section 623(a)(2). Instead,
they viewed the difference in the provisions as the result of the type
of acts prohibited by Section 623(a)(2).45 According to the
concurrence, Section 623(a)(1) prohibited acts that were inherently
damaging to employees, but Section 623(a)(2) dealt with acts that
were not necessarily damaging.46 Accordingly, Congress inserted the
language “in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee” to explain that the acts in Section 623(a)(2)
47
were prohibited.
Moreover, the plain meaning the concurring justices drew from
the statute differed from that of the plurality. The concurrence began
its argument with the fact that Section 623(a)(1) did not authorize
disparate impact liability. It then attempted to prove that the language
“because of such individual’s age” had the same meaning in Section
623(a)(1) and in Section 623(a)(2). In support, the concurring justices
noted that the language is identical and appeared in consecutive
48
paragraphs. They then argued, based on statutory construction, that
the comma before “because of such individual’s age” indicated that

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1542.
See id. at 1542 n.6.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1550 (O’Connor , J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000)).
Id.
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the “because of” language modified the entire provision, rather than
49
only the phrase that appeared directly before it.
Sections 623(a)(1) and 623(a)(2) were not the only provisions of
the statute that draw the Justices’ attention. The plurality and
concurrence also supported their positions by pointing to Section
623(f)(1), the “reasonable factors other than age” (“RFOA”)
provision, which provides: “[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer
. . . to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . where the
50
differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.”
According to the plurality, the RFOA clause showed Congress
authorized disparate impact claims in the ADEA because without
disparate impact the clause would be redundant.51 The plurality’s
reasoning began with the premise that disparate treatment included a
finding of employer motivation to discriminate, which was not present
if the employment action was based on a factor other than age.52
Because the employment action protected by the RFOA clause is not
53
disparate treatment, it must instead be disparate impact. If the
ADEA did not authorize disparate impact, the plurality concluded,
the RFOA clause would only provide a defense for employers who
have not violated the act.54
The concurrence conceded that the RFOA clause in the absence
of disparate impact was “arguably redundant” but believed that the
55
duplication was intentional. According to the concurrence, the
duplication was the result of “Congress’ abundance of caution” in
protecting employers who act without the intent to discriminate on
the basis of age.56 Justice O’Connor found, “[t]he role of this
protection is to afford employers an independent safe harbor from
57
liability.” In addition to the safe harbor argument, the concurrence

49. Id.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
51. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1544 (reasoning that “[i]n most disparate-treatment cases, if an
employer in fact acted on a factor other than age, the action would not be prohibited under
subsection (a) in the first place. In those disparate-treatment cases, such as in Hazen Paper
itself, the RFOA provision is simply unnecessary to avoid liability under the ADEA, since there
was no prohibited action in the first place”) (citations omitted).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id. (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
55. Id. at 1551 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1551 (emphasis in original).
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also pointed to two functions of the RFOA clause that were not
related to disparate impact. First, in mixed motive claims, the clause
provided a defense to employers who act based on a reasonable
factor other than age, even if age also had some influence on the
58
decision. Second, the requirement that the factor be reasonable
would prevent employers from avoiding liability by citing
59
unreasonable factors as mere pretexts for age discrimination.
The sum of the Justices’ interpretation of the ADEA’s history and
text was that five members of the Court agreed the ADEA
authorized disparate impact claims. Those five votes came from the
unlikely coalition of Justice Scalia and the four historically liberal
Justices—Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Scalia based
his decision, which concurred in part and concurred in judgment, on a
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
60
administrative law analysis. According to Justice Scalia, the EEOC’s
regulation recognizing disparate impact for the ADEA was
61
reasonable and therefore worthy of judicial deference. Justice
Scalia’s defection may have been abetted by the leadership void
among the conservative Justices left by the absence of Chief Justice
Rehnquist who did not participate in the case because he was battling
thyroid cancer. Had he been in the chambers, the Chief Justice may
have been able to persuade Justice Scalia to view the case in the same
manner as Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.62
Disparate impact liability under the ADEA, if similar to disparate
impact under Title VII, would provide plaintiffs with an easier method
for proving age discrimination. Millions of American workers are over
forty years old and may be subject to a “gray ceiling.” Prior to Smith,
workers over forty filed nearly 18,000 charges of discrimination per
63
year. Because plaintiffs who are unable to show that their employers
were motivated by discrimination may prevail under disparate impact,

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1546 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
61. See id. at 1546–47.
62. See Posting of Tom Goldstein to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/
movabletype/archives/2005/06/the_54_cases_an.html (June 30, 2005, 12:22 EST).
63. Number of charges filed in fiscal year 2004. EEOC Statistics: ADEA Charges FY 1992FY 2004, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
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the number of employees filing charges under the new system may
increase dramatically.
Thus, although the decision in Smith v. Jackson appears a
significant victory for employees, the ramifications of the decision will
be limited—employers do not have to fear the massive liability that
such a regime would impose. Eight Justices agreed on one issue: if the
ADEA does authorize disparate impact claims, those claims are
narrower than the disparate impact claims currently available under
Title VII. Smith indicates by both overt and implied signals that
disparate impact under the ADEA will be substantially narrower than
under Title VII. Interestingly, the plurality, after having argued for the
availability of disparate impact, adopted several of the concurrence’s
points arguing that the scope of disparate impact should be limited.
The Justices agreed that the form of disparate impact from Ward’s
64
Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio should govern disparate impact
65
available under the ADEA.
In Ward’s Cove, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of
66
disparate impact under Title VII. Two years after the Ward’s Cove
decision, Congress amended the Court’s interpretation of disparate
67
impact as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The amendment
broadened the scope of disparate impact under Title VII and led to a
large increase in employer liability. According to one study, the
number of charges of race discrimination received by the EEOC
following the amendments increased thirteen percent and the number
of charges of gender discrimination increased by forty-six percent.68
At the same time, employers paid forty-seven percent more to
plaintiffs alleging race discrimination and eighty-seven percent more
to plaintiffs alleging gender discrimination. Notably, Congress did not

64. Ward’s Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
65. See Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
66. See id.
67. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). See also Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071 (stating
congressional purpose “to codify the concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio”) (citations omitted).
68. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, The Unintended Consequences of the ’91 Civil Rights Act,
Regulation, June 2003, at 42–43, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/v26n2-7.pdf.
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grant a similar expansion of disparate impact under the ADEA.
Without a statute to overrule the Supreme Court, ADEA plaintiffs
will have to survive the rigorous Ward’s Cove standard.
The strongest indication that the scope of disparate impact under
the ADEA will be narrow may be the Court’s holding in Smith that
the plaintiffs failed to establish a claim of disparate impact. The
plaintiffs identified the pay plan as discriminatory because it provided
proportionally higher pay raises for employees with less seniority. The
plurality deemed the pay plan insufficiently specific and demanded
the plaintiffs identify a “specific test, requirement, or practice within
the pay plan.”70 This level of specificity will often be difficult for
plaintiffs to show because employers typically have control over
employment practices. The plurality also shows the narrow bounds of
disparate impact under the ADEA by accepting, without question, the
employer’s articulated RFOA. This acceptance demonstrates that
employers may escape liability by stating that its action was based on
any reasonable justification other than age. The justification will not
be subjected to a “less restrictive alternative” test, and the court will
not question the legitimacy of the justification.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Alston & Bird Professor of Law at Duke
University School of Law, commented on the case, “[t]he practical
reality is that it is often much easier for a civil rights plaintiff to prove
disparate impact than discriminatory intent. Although the Court ruled
that Smith failed to demonstrate impermissible impact, the Court has
significantly opened the courthouse doors to plaintiffs bringing age
71
discrimination claims.” For the reasons mentioned above, however,
the decision will only aid plaintiffs in extraordinarily rare
circumstances. The circumstances required are as follows: (1) no
evidence of employer’s motivation to discriminate, because with such
evidence the plaintiff could proceed under disparate treatment; (2)
the plaintiff can point to a specific discriminatory practice within the
adverse employment action; and (3) the employer is unable to list one
RFOA. These requirements will almost never be shown for two

69. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105 Stat. 1071 (amending the burden of proof in disparate
impact cases for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but not for the ADEA).
70. Smith, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
71. So Far, a Surprising Year for Civil Rights, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK
NEWSLETTER v. 13 (CEB, Oakland, CA) 2005, available at http://ceb.com/newsletterv13/
CivilRights.htm.
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reasons. First, employers will likely always be able to articulate one
non-discriminatory factor in its action. Second, once the employer has
articulated its factor, the plaintiff will only win in the event that the
articulated non-discriminatory factor is clearly a pretext for
discrimination. Because the Supreme Court has shown it will not
examine the legitimacy of the articulated factor, the factor will only be
denied with a prima facie showing of employer motivation to
discriminate. Employer motivation to discriminate, however, means
the plaintiff could have previously brought the claim as a disparate
treatment claim. Future plaintiffs are likely to learn the same lesson
as the plaintiffs in Smith found at the end of their long road to the
Supreme Court: the inclusion of disparate impact under the ADEA is
a hollow victory.

